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ABSTRACT 
 
Human resource (HR) outsourcing research has primarily focused on the client with little 
attention paid to the service provider. As an initial step in understanding this important 
stakeholder in the HR outsourcing relationship, this study focuses on the financial performance of 
HR service firms that publicly announce outsourcing contracts. From the provider’s perspective, 
we investigate firm performance changes subsequent to outsourcing contract announcements, 
using a sample of 94 publicly available press releases. Our tests show that in the long term, small 
HR service providers contracted by large client firms experience improvements in operating 
profitability and margins. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
otwithstanding the challenging economic times, the global human resource outsourcing (HRO) market is 
expected to increase in value from $26.8 billion in 2006 to $43.7 billion by 2011 according to Gartner, a 
global IT research and advisory company (Griffiths, 2008).   Public reports indicate that more than 60% 
of firms engage in some form of human resource outsourcing (Esen, 2004; Adler, 2003; Dell, 2004). As firms 
continue to outsource HR services to reduce costs, improve service quality, and enhance core competency (Shen, 
2005; Miller, 2008), finding the right supplier is essential to the success of outsourcing contracts (Feeny et al., 
2005). To meet the demand for services, an industry of providers is developing. Thus, the focus of potential HRO 
client firms has shifted from the fundamental decision to outsource to selecting the right provider, according to Jay 
Rising, President of HR Outsourcing for Hewitt (HROT Staff, 2008).  
 
Clients engaged in long term, high dollar value HR arrangements depend on providers for continuous 
services for the life of the contract. Thus, they have a stake in the providers’ long term success. On the other hand, 
clients also have an incentive to reap maximum benefits from each contract and are therefore likely to behave in 
ways that erode margins of providers (Feeny et al., 2005). Academic researchers have paid relatively little attention 
to the performance consequences for HR service providers (Jenster and Pedersen, 2000; Levina and Ross, 2003; 
Taylor, 2007). A successful outsourcing arrangement requires the provider accept increased risks in exchange for 
some benefit (Taylor, 2007), the most obvious, increased revenue. HR service providers also benefit from 
standardizing processes and thereby achieving economies of scale across clients leading to reduced costs of 
providing services (Cooke et al., 2005). Revenue growth and lower costs should improve profitability and deliver 
greater shareholder value (Kaplan and Norton, 2000). Although individual contracts often provide substantial 
revenue sources, they also signal provider capabilities to other potential clients. Consistent with a signaling 
argument, Gao (2005) finds that service providers experience significant abnormal returns around contract 
announcements. However, Gao’s sample includes outsourcing providers of a broad range of services, and the 
analyses do not examine long run operating performance following the positive market reaction.  
N 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2010 Volume 26, Number 5 
78 
In this study, we contribute to the literature by focusing on the providers of HR services. Our employment 
of archival financial methods and information to address the research questions extends the survey and case study 
methods commonly used in previous outsourcing research. Human resource service providers are individually 
important stakeholders in the HRO agreement and collectively form a growing industry (Feeny et al., 2005). In 
particular, we examine the long term operating performance effects on service providers. Our long term operating 
performance tests show that small HR service providers contracted by large client firms experience significant 
improvements in operating profitability.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
 
Outsourcing literature traditionally relies on transaction cost economics (TCE) to hypothesize outsourcing 
decisions and results (Lievens and Corte, 2008). Transaction cost economics proposes that firms consider asset 
specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of an activity in choosing to perform functions in-house or to contract with an 
external service provider (Williamson, 1979, 1991). The overall goal is to minimize the sum of transaction and 
production costs. Asset Specificity is the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by 
alternative users without sacrifice of productive value. Uncertainty refers to the expected variation in the demand for 
activities and the inability to monitor activities. Frequency describes the volume or rate at which activities are 
performed (Widener and Selto, 1999). Managers of client firms consider these attributes in the outsourcing decision 
(Walker and Weber, 1984; Roodhooft and Warlop, 1999). 
 
Moreover, the TCE attributes of various HR services also influence the profitability of human resource 
services firms. For example, firms providing services requiring asset specificity are able to charge higher fees to 
compensate for the added risk and investment, leading to higher profits (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). While 
client firms may not be able to justify an investment in technology necessary to deliver state of the art HR services, 
providers can develop those technological capabilities and leverage them across multiple clients. Similarly, human 
resource providers might receive higher revenue to compensate for providing services that often vary in activity 
level or are difficult to monitor. Finally, in performing HR functions which occur frequently, such as payroll 
processing, human resource service providers can develop efficiencies, and in some cases standardize processes 
across clients and pool resources to experience economies of scale leading to reduced costs of providing the service 
(Williamson, 1981; Abraham and Taylor, 1996).  
 
The potential improvements in provider operating performance following a new outsourcing contract may 
be delayed because of time required to implement the contract and recoup initial investment and set-up costs. 
According to John Gibson, president for the Convergys HR management business line, the time frame for HRO 
implementation can exceed 24 months and accounting treatment of these contracts is conservative (Hansen, 2008). 
Consequently, changes in operating performance are likely to be observed over the long term. In addition to overall 
operating performance effects, we also expect differential performance effects based on the relative sizes of 
providers and clients.  
 
HR providers servicing large clients can be expected to handle large transaction volumes of products and 
provide more types of services, which leads to lower transaction costs and higher profit (Dyer, 1997). Since large 
firms, in general, should enjoy economies of scale in performing HR services internally, a contracted provider 
serving a large client can be expected to attain the same economies of scale and resulting profitability effects. Larger 
HR service providers should have better sourcing capabilities, economies of scale, and economies of scope to help 
them deliver successful projects and maintain greater expertise (Levina and Ross, 2003; Feeny et al., 2005; Rottman 
and Lacity, 2008). In an information technology (IT) outsourcing context, Rottman and Lacity (2008) report 
advantages of contracting with a large supplier, because of the large supplier’s greater access to experienced 
technical personnel, while small suppliers may have difficulty attracting skilled employees and managing projects 
effectively. Thus, we expect that large HR service provides will perform better in the long term following the HR 
outsourcing contract. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Large HR service providers will perform better following HR outsourcing contract announcements.  
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 Conversely, small suppliers offer other benefits to clients that can lead to potential positive wealth effects. 
Small providers are likely to pay more attention to the client because the client represents a larger portion of their 
revenues (Feeny et al., 2005; Rottman and Lacity, 2008), especially when the client is a large firm. Additionally, 
small providers have an incentive to cultivate positive relationships with clients to signal trustworthiness to other 
potential clients, thereby increasing their future business opportunities (Lievens and Corte, 2008). Small providers 
are also more likely to offer unique specialized services than large providers, which can enhance their bargaining 
power and profitability (Grossman and Helpman, 2002). Furthermore, small providers contracting with large clients 
may be able to leverage their specialized services and the large clients’ economies of scale to achieve higher 
performance. This leads to the following hypotheses:  
 
H2a:  HR service providers serving large clients will perform better following HR outsourcing contract 
announcements.  
 
H2b:  Small HR service providers serving large clients will perform better following HR outsourcing contract 
announcements.  
 
DATA AND METHOD  
 
We test our hypotheses using a sample of publicly released human resource outsourcing announcements 
taken from a search on Business Wire using Lexis-Nexis. Of the initial sample of 485 announcements, 201 were for 
government, privately held, or other provider firms for which firm level financial data was not available on the 
Compustat database. We eliminated announcements lacking the requisite data, leaving 94 announcements by 67 
firms. We carefully reviewed our selected announcements. The announcements, released between 1994 and 2005, 
specified a variety of HR services, including staffing and hiring, benefits administration, workforce management and 
employee communications, payroll and payroll tax filing. We also partitioned the sample by client and provider size, 
the details of which are in Table 1. We divide the sample at the median based on quarterly sales resulting in 46 
larger providers and 48 smaller providers. We then categorize clients similarly based on sales for public companies. 
The “other” category reflects the substantial number of government and not-for-profit organizations that outsource 
their HR services.  
 
 
Table I:  Number of Human Resource Service Providers and Clients 
  Clients 
  Large Small Other Total 
Providers 
Large 12 12 22 46 
Small 13 10 25 48 
Total 25 22 47 94 
 
 
Table 2:  Financial Characteristics of Human Resource Service Providers 
  Small Providers Large Providers 
 Financial characteristic Mean Med. SD N Mean Med. SD N 
Pre-announcement 
(4 quarters) 
Sales ($ mm) 69.8 30.9 73.6 188 1,441.4 635.5 1,376.5 188 
Op income  ($ mm) 7.9 2.6 16.8 174 222.1 99.8 202.9 178 
Segment count 1.6 1.0 1.1 188 3.5 3.0 1.7 188 
Long term debt  ($ mm) 26.9 2.5 71.5 187 461.4 155.2 1,075.4 187 
Market value  ($ mm) 646.8 379.2 843.1 188 7,743.2 4,696.5 7,422.2 188 
Market-to-book ratio 3.5 2.5 2.2 176 4.9 3.4 4.1 188 
Post-announcement 
(12 quarters) 
Sales ($ mm) 82.0 52.3 77.9 491 1,498.5 695.4 1,465.4 468 
Op income  ($ mm) 10.5 3.8 19.4 445 227.6 100.6 210.7 465 
Segment count 1.6 1.0 1.1 515 3.5 3.0 1.7 478 
Long term debt  ($ mm) 45.3 5.6 99.9 487 399.9 144.8 826.9 468 
Market value  ($ mm) 661.7 379.2 869.1 515 7,433.6 4,686.9 7,499.7 478 
Market-to-book ratio 3.5 2.5 2.3 480 5.0 3.5 4.3 478 
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In Table 2, we provide summary financial characteristics for the HR service providers. The small 
providers’ quarterly sales are less than $70 million on average and they typically have only one business segment. 
They carry some long term debt; the median long term debt pre-announcement is $2.5 million and post-
announcement is $5.6 million. The market seems to view their prospects positively, since they enjoy relatively high 
market values. Mean (median) market-to-book ratios are 3.5 (2.5) in both periods, consistent with higher growth 
opportunities. Large providers are about 17 times larger than the small providers on average based on quarterly 
sales. Large providers typically have three or more business segments, substantially more long term debt, and much 
higher market values than the small providers do. Their median market-to-book ratios are greater than three, 
consistent with high growth expectations.  
 
Analysis of long term operating performance effects and firm size 
 
We test the change in financial performance around the outsourcing announcement using two common 
measures of operating performance: operating return on assets (ROA), calculated as operating income before 
depreciation divided by total assets, and operating profit margin (ROS), calculated as operating income before 
depreciation divided by total revenue. Operating ROA measures a firms’ profitability relative to their total assets. 
Operating profit margin measures a firms’ profit per dollar of revenue. These are both standard measures of 
operating profitability closely related to operating cash flow, since they do not include depreciation. HR providers 
have substantial depreciation charges due to the capital intensive nature of the business, so including depreciation 
could mask otherwise positive performance. 
 
We form two periods around each HR outsourcing contract announcement. The first period is the four 
quarters prior to the announcement. The second period is the 12 quarters following the announcement. We employ 
12 quarters following the announcement to allow the providers to recoup initial start up costs and establish a 
relatively steady performance state. We analyze changes in performance following the contract compared to 
performance prior to the contract using the following models: 
 
Op_metric = b0 + b1 small_p_after + b2 large_p_after + b3 small_c_after + b4 large_c_after  
       + b5 pre_contract_size + b6 pre_contract_op_metric + e (1) 
 
Op_metric = b0 + b1 small_p_after + b2 large_p_after + b3 small_c_after + b4 large_c_after  
       + b5 small_p_after x large_c_after + b6 large_p_after x small_c_after + b7 pre_contract_size  
       + b8 pre_contract_op_metric                                                                                          (2) 
 
Op_metric equals either operating ROA or profit margin. Small_p_after and large_p_after are dummy variables that 
indicate small or large providers in the period after the contract announcement. We divide the sample at the median 
based on total sales to form the small and large dummy variables. Similarly, small_c_after and large_c_after are 
dummy variables that indicate small or large clients after the contract announcement. A significant positive 
coefficient for these variables indicates higher performance following the contract announcement. Small_p_after x 
large_c_after and large_p_after x small_c_after are interaction terms that measure the performance effect of the 
particular combination of provider and client. Pre_contract_size is the mean total assets or total sales (log 
transformed) for the four quarters prior to the announcement for each firm. Pre_contract_op_metric is the mean 
ROA or profit margin for the four quarters prior to the announcement for each firm. These two variables control for 
differences in size and performance prior to the outsourcing contract. We also control for industry, using three-digit 
SIC, in the multivariate analysis of Equations 1 and 2. Since we use panel data, we adjust for potential 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation with Newey-West standard errors (StataCorp, 2007).  
 
TEST RESULTS 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 
 To determine whether HRO providers experience long term operating performance improvements, we 
examine the mean quarterly operating return on assets (ROA) and operating profit margins (ROS) around the 
outsourcing announcements. Figure 1 presents a chart of quarterly operating ROA and shows that with the exception 
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of small providers serving large clients, there is little change in performance following the contract announcements. 
However, the performance of small providers contracting with large clients increases substantially in the second 
year after the contract announcement and more than three times the pre-contract levels in the third year after the 
announcement.  
 
Figure 2 presents a chart of quarterly operating profit margins that shows similar performance patterns. 
Again, the small providers contracting with large clients experience the greatest increase. In general, large providers 
have higher performance before the contract and experience little change in performance following the contract. The 
difference in operating ROA (average operating ROA is approximately 3%) compared to profit margins (average 
operating profit margin is approximately 11%) demonstrates the capital intensive nature of the HR outsourcing 
industry.  
 
 
Figure 1: Mean Quarterly Operating ROA Around Outsourcing Announcements 
 
 
 
Only small providers contracting with large clients see an increase in operating performance after the 
contract announcements. Untabulated results show that the average increase in operating ROA for small providers 
with large clients is 1.9% (t = 2.29, p < 0.02, one-tailed test), and the corresponding increase in profit margins is 
9.3% (t = 2.70, p < 0.01, one-tailed test). On average, large providers have 1.7% higher operating ROA and 7.4% 
higher profit margins than small providers following the contract announcements. Overall, large providers 
outperform small providers and small HRO providers experience differential operating performance benefits when 
serving large clients. These results are consistent with hypotheses H1, H2a, and H3b and suggest that small HR 
service providers have the potential to improve overall operating performance, rivaling that of larger providers, by 
contracting with larger clients. 
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Figure 2: Mean Quarterly Operating Profit Margins (ROS) Around Outsourcing Announcements 
 
 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
Although we observe significant improvement in ROA and ROS following the outsourcing announcements 
for small providers contracting with large clients in our univariate analyses, multivariate analysis allows us to 
control for other factors that potentially influence overall operating performance. Table 3 presents a multivariate 
analysis of the changes in operating performance following the contract announcements. Operating ROA and ROS 
variables were winsorized 1% at each end of the distribution to limit the influence of outliers. Columns 1 and 2 
present results for operating ROA based on Equations 1 and 2, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present similar results 
for operating profit margins. Observations with studentized residuals greater than 3 standard deviations from the 
mean were eliminated. By construction, these results focus on changes in performance, since the dummy variables 
all equal 0 for the four quarters prior to the contract announcements. These results show that large providers see a 
modest but significant slip in operating performance following the contract announcements and small providers 
experience no increase in performance.  
 
Columns 2 and 4 examine the interaction of small provider with large client, as well as large provider with 
small client. The coefficient on the small_p_after x large_c_after variable is significant, showing that on average, 
this combination performs better than other combinations or either small providers or large clients in general. These 
results confirm hypothesis H2b indicating that small HR service providers serving large clients perform better 
following HR outsourcing contract announcements. 
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Operating ROA and Profit Margins around Outsourcing Announcements 
Variables  Operating ROA Operating Profit Margin (ROS) 
 
(1) 
Coef. (t-stat) 
(2) 
Coef. (t-stat) 
(3) 
Coef. (t-stat) 
(4) 
Coef. (t-stat) 
Constant -0.004(1.00) -0.007(1.53) 0.270(19.22) 0.254(18.57) 
Small_p_after 0.002(0.68) -0.000(0.13) 0.012(1.50) 0.004(0.50) 
Large_p_after -0.007(3.99) -0.006(2.82) -0.016(2.97) -0.009(1.62) 
Small_c_after -0.005(2.69) -0.004(1.63) -0.013(1.79) -0.027(2.30) 
Large_c_after 0.003(1.34) -0.004(1.54) 0.026(3.36) -0.018(2.98) 
Small_p_after x Large_c_after  0.016(3.43)  0.108(6.20) 
Large_p_after x Small_c_after  -0.002(0.69)  0.023(1.78) 
Pre_contract_size 0.001(1.03) 0.001(1.21) 0.003(1.21) 0.004(1.96) 
Pre_contract_ROA/ROS  0.125(14.18) 0.127(14.59) 0.621(16.27) 0.630(18.42) 
Observations 1220 1220 1220 1220 
Adjusted R-square 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.69 
 
 
Discussion  
 
When a firm decides to outsource its human resource services, it must consider the cost and benefits of 
doing so, with the selection of the provider being a critical factor in the success of the outsourcing arrangement. This 
study examines human resource outsourcing from the perspective of the provider who also must consider costs and 
benefits before agreeing to serve a particular client. Prior HR outsourcing literature rarely focuses on this important, 
but critical stakeholder in the outsourcing contract.  
 
Our results provide insight into factors influencing the profitability of HR service firms. Small providers 
serving large clients show significantly improved operating performance in the long term, suggesting that small 
providers engaging large clients are able to experience benefits resulting from a trusting relationship with the client 
(Lievens and Corte, 2008) and from exploiting economies of scale. In this study, we extend HRO research by 
examining overall performance metrics of human resource service providers as well as the provider/client pairing as 
suggested by Lievens and Corte (2008). With a preponderance of outsourcing research focused on qualitative factors 
regarding the decision and perceptions of participants, we see an opportunity and a need to study further the 
quantitative factors driving the decision and the quantitative results once the decision has been implemented. To 
understand fully the actual costs and benefits of human resource outsourcing requires access to information such as 
HR staff salaries, HR information technology investment costs and human resource operation productivity.  
 
As with all research, this study has limitations. The small sample size is partly a result of the sample 
composition. We use publicly released outsourcing announcements, therefore, our sample does not include providers 
who entered into new contracts but did not publicly announce either by choice or because of the client’s prohibition. 
Our analyses require financial information available only for publicly traded firms, eliminating an important 
segment of the HR outsourcing providers as well as a number of clients from our sample who operate as private, 
not-for-profit or government organizations. Finally, because of the small sample size, we are unable to test the effect 
of the type of HRO service provided on operating performance. 
  
 In spite of these limitations, this study offers useful information for human resource services firm managers 
regarding factors influencing long term operating performance. In particular, our tests show that small providers 
serving large clients experience improved long term operating performance. This initial study examining overall 
performance effects for HRO providers is foundational to understanding more specific operational effects 
experienced by both providers and clients engaging in new outsourcing contracts. 
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